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I. — INTRODUCTION
The emergence in the software industry of an alternative production model
based on free/libre activities has generated new and original competition out-
comes. The economic analysis of these outcomes reveals two major trends.
First, the emergence of original cooperation patterns between open source
communities and commercial editors of proprietary software, which have led
to « hybrid » business models and several studies show how software firms are
leveraging open source projects for commercial purposes (Hertel et al., 2003 ;
Henkel, 2004 ; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005 ; von Krogh and von Hippel,
2006 ; Harhoff and Mayrhofer, 2008 ; Rolandsson et al., 2011). Within this fra-
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mework, cooperative participative patterns can be beneficial to both commu-
nity-based and commercial organizations provided suitable governance
mechanisms have been defined. There are numerous examples of commercial-
community alignments in the literature (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006 ; Dahlander
and Wallin, 2006 ; Dahlander, 2007 ; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008 ; Ghosh
et al., 2008 ; West and Lakhani, 2008 ; Riehle, 2009 ; Stam, 2009).
Second, the open source software development model is allowing new
players to compete in the software market. Competition in the software mar-
ket is governed by different parameters (such as the quality, functionalities,
and cost of proprietary solutions, or the size of open source communities) and
the co-existence of proprietary and open software solutions is likely to depend
on the environment in which the software is produced (e.g., type and magnitu-
de of network externalities on users’ and/or developers’ side). For instance,
some authors find that open source software is likely to overtake proprietary
solutions for both informational (Kuan, 2002) and quality reasons (Bessen,
2002). Others find that firms are more likely to persist in the competitive mar-
ket than open source projects (Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006).
However, many studies show that both types of software production activities
are likely to co-exist in the market. For instance, Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003),
using an agent-based model, show that proprietary and libre software will co-
exist when network effects are moderate and Johnson (2002) stresses that the
success of open source over proprietary solutions applies only when users
invest a certain level of effort to contributing open source code. Similarly, in a
mixed duopoly model in which producers’ objective functions differ,
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) find that competition outcomes may lead
to a shared market situation. They analyse a two-sided competition model
involving an open source and a proprietary platform. Dalle and Jullien (2000 ;
2003) present a dynamic simulation of the diffusion of Linux that considers
local and global network effects. They point to the crucial role of early adop-
ters for the success or failure of open source projects and underline the large
impact of compatibility and governance models on competition outcomes.
Thus, the co-existence of both types of software in the market is a possible
competition outcome.
However some theoretical studies find that competition outcomes are less
clear and are dependent on the way commercial firms react to the libre activi-
ty. Bitzer (2004) focuses on the impact of product-based heterogeneity, sho-
wing that incumbents (i.e., proprietary software firms) can remain profitable
by setting higher prices. Following the job signalling hypothesis formulated by
Lerner and Tirole (2002), Mustonen (2003) focuses on the role in competition
of the wages paid by proprietary firms. He shows that commercial firms can
crowd out the diffusion of the open source software solution by offering higher
wages, and that both types of software can co-exist in the market. Lanzi (2009)
finds that, in a duopoly setting, competition outcomes depend on the level of
complexity of the open source software solution, such that open source may
dominate if learning costs are sufficiently low but a shared-market outcome is
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°136, 4ème trimestre 2011 111
more likely when learning costs are high. Välimäki and Oksanen (2005) focus
on the role of switching costs in software adoption patterns and highlight
various competition outcomes. Leoncini et al. (2008) introduce different types
of innovation patterns and interoperability features in a dynamic model and
find that a perfect interoperability innovation pattern is likely to lead to a sha-
red-market outcome whereas the results are more ambiguous for other innova-
tion patterns.
This article analyses adoption dynamics in the market for software when a
proprietary software firm competes with an open source software community.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we introduce the role of
expectations about adoption patterns. Most of the existing literature do not
explicitly consider this issue and focus on particular type of equilibrium. We
here analyze the whole set of (Nash) equilibria coming from the introduction
of open source software. Second, we characterize software as an experience
good. Such a feature is critical when dealing with adoption issues, since the
quality of the software cannot in this case be perfectly assessed ex ante. Third,
we consider adoption patterns taking explicit account of the coexistence of
heterogeneous users (i.e., users with different programming abilities and dis-
tinct preferences). We use the typology in Franke and von Hippel (2003) to dis-
tinguish developer-users and end-users. We define a theoretical framework in
which the need for specific functionalities not provided by proprietary softwa-
re are the motivation for development. This framework takes account of diffe-
rences in licensing costs when proprietary software is substituted by open
source software released under GPL (General Public License) terms. We defi-
ne a theoretical competition game model between a monopolistic firm that pro-
duces proprietary software and a community that develops alternative GPL-
based open source software. In this framework, we identify the strategies that
proprietary software firms may adopt to remain on the market. We also eva-
luate the welfare generated by the introduction of libre solutions in order to
measure the social effect of open source software, something that few studies
have focused on so far (Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003 ; von Engelhardt and
Maurer, 2010).
We show that the final levels of adoption of both open source and proprieta-
ry software depend on the initial conditions relative to users’ expectations. In
some settings, winner-takes-all competition may arise, which may lead to the
crowding out of one or other of the types of software. Other settings lead to a
mixed equilibrium with users distributed between the two types of software
according to their abilities to develop or to adopt, and to the software adoption
costs. In most cases, the introduction of Open Source Software as a potential
competitor leads to multiple equilibria. Such multiple equilibria are imper-
fectly controlled by the proprietary firm, thus, its strategy can be understood
as a balance between a low price-high quality and high price-low quality stra-
tegy. By analysing the qualitative properties of winner-takes-all and separating
equilibria, we show that the existence of a sole credible open source alternati-
ve improves the end user’s utility, even if ultimately only the proprietary solu-
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tion is adopted. In that respect, open source software may be considered as a
potential threat on the software market. From consumers’ point of view, such
threat drives the market to a more favourable situation. However, we show that,
under some circumstances, the diffusion of open source software generates
conflicts of interest. In some cases, there is a divide between users and the
firm, but also the interests of some users are aligned to those of the firm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyses the Nash equilibrium generated by the model. Section 4 discusses the
qualitative properties of this equilibrium and introduces welfare-related issues.
Section 5 concludes.
II. — THE MODEL – GENERAL SETTINGS
The model analyses the interactions between a firm producing proprietary
software and two categories of users, end-users and developer-users, defined
by their ability to contribute to the development of open source software.
We characterize the model as a two-step game. First, the firm defines a price
and quality strategy. Second, potential users decide whether to adopt or not.
2.1. End-users and developers
There are two categories of users, namely developers (D, in proportion m of
the total population) and end-users (EU, in proportion (1 – m) of the total popu-
lation whose size is set to 1). End-users and developers differ in two ways.
First, developers are able to develop new functionalities and customize open
source software by adding new lines of code, but end-users are not. In other
words, since source code is open, developers can develop new functionalities
for their own benefit. Once these functionalities are developed, there is no cost
in releasing them to the whole community of developers and in giving end-
users free access to these functionalities (1). Second, the adoption costs are
different for end-users and developers. Developers are generally expert users
(e.g., engineers, computer scientists) and are used to adopting new software,
while end-users may face high initial adoption costs in choosing new softwa-
re. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that these costs are generally higher for
(1) We restrict our analysis to GPL licences. Other types of licences (e.g., the BSD licence)
allow any user or developer to commercialize their own software derived from initial soft-
ware. These other types of licences raise additional incentive problems for developers who
may be motivated to « close » the code of their customized software instead of making it
freely available to other users. This specific case could be studied as an extension of this
article.
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open source software than would be incurred in the adoption of a proprietary
solution. One reason for this is that open source software is developed prima-
rily in open source projects which often are led by expert users who do not
have time to devote extensive tutorials/FAQs, user-friendly interfaces, etc. (2).
For all these reasons, we suppose that developers – as opposed to end-users –
do not face adoption costs when adopting open source software. Among the
population of end-users, though, some agents will be more likely to adopt open
source software more quickly. This varying ability translates into heteroge-
neous adoption costs, which here are assumed to be uniformly distributed bet-
ween 0 and c−EU (c−EU > 0).
2.2. Proprietary software and open source software
The two types of software need to provide both generic and specialized func-
tionalities. Generic functionalities are commonly used by all users ; specific
functionalities differ according to each user’s needs. To depict this heteroge-
neity, we assume that users are uniformly distributed on a unit circle. Users can
choose (i) to adopt proprietary – closed source – software, (ii) to adopt GPL –
based open source software, or (iii) not to adopt. In the last situation, we sup-
pose that users can accomplish the same task manually or using a combination
of previously acquired software (i.e., at no purchase cost). By convention, this
default option leads to a null payoff.
2.3. Strategy of the proprietary firm
We suppose that a single commercial firm produces proprietary software.
Because software is a digital good, its reproduction (or variable) costs are negli-
gible (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). We assume them to be null and independent
of the number of adopters. The development cost depends on the quality q of the
software that we assimilate in the extent of the specialized functionalities cove-
red by the software. By devoting more effort, the firm can develop more specia-
lized functionalities in order to cover more specific needs on the unit circle.
Then the quality q is depicted by the number of available specialized functiona-
lities and is expressed as a fraction of the unit circle circumference (q Œ [0,1]).
The quality and its related cost g (q) are controlled by the firm. Since users are
uniformly distributed, it is reasonable to suppose that the software editor first
develops those functionalities that are less costly. Let us assume, therefore, that
(2) It could be argued that users may incur an adoption cost even when adopting proprietary
software. However, because user-friendliness is an important factor in adoption, commer-
cial firms devote marketing efforts to maximizing the accessibility of their software. Thus,
it seems reasonable to distinguish open source from proprietary software by overlooking
the adoption costs required to use proprietary software.
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development costs increase at an increasing rate with quality q (i.e., g″(.) > 0).
One simple specification is given by g (q) = βq2 (β > 0).
Let us denote by cL (cL > 0) the licence fee paid to the firm by each user.
When nP (nP Œ [0,1]) figures the proportion of users of proprietary software
and (q, cL) the quality and the level of fees chosen by the firm, the profit maxi-
mization program of the firm is defined by (1) :
max      π = sup (0, nPcL – βq
2) (1)
cL ≥ 0, q Œ [0,1]
2.4. Utility generated by proprietary software adoption
The ability of both proprietary software and open source software to perform
generic functionalities depends strongly on the total number of adopters. This
network externality is motivated by several factors. For instance, compatibili-
ty among users and availability of complementary services and software are
two examples of cases that are likely to lead to the development of a positive
network externality. We suppose, therefore, that the utility associated with
these functionalities depends on the number of users of the software solution
considered. Consequently, we assume that the utility generated by the general
needs ¶1 (n
P) positively depends on the level of adoption nPof proprietary soft-
ware (with ¶1′(.) > 0, ¶1 (0) = 0 and ¶1 (1) = α1, α1 > 0). For convenience, we
set ¶1 (n
P) = α1n
P.
Users are heterogeneous regarding specific needs. Let us assume that the
value they derive from specific functionalities is normalized to d (d > 0) for
any type of software. Since software is mainly an experience good, risk-neu-
tral users need to anticipate the value they derive from specific functionalities
inasmuch as they cannot perfectly anticipate the whole set of functionalities
they are likely to use once the software solution is adopted. In the case of pro-
prietary software, the editor develops a proportion q of specific functionalities
which are known by all users, and users expect a level of utility defined so that
dq + 0 (1 – q) = dq (cf. figure 1). Since the source code is closed, the range of
the functionalities available is strictly ruled by the firm.
Once the licence cost cL charged by the firm has been deduced, the net utili-
ty derived from the adoption of proprietary software can be expressed as fol-
lows :
u
p
i = α1n
P + dq – cL (2)
2.5. The utility generated by open source software adoption
The adoption of open source software does not involve a licence fee. As
already assumed in the case of proprietary software adoption, we suppose that
open source software meets all the generic functionalities required for adop-
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tion (3). As already mentioned, generic functionalities are subject to a direct
externality. Also, developers – in the case of open source software – can free-
ly modify and customize the initial software solution. The modular architectu-
re of most contemporary open source software invites customization allowing
open source developers to add functionalities that will benefit all users. Since
open source software is maintained and managed by developers, the utility
derived from specialized functionalities is highly dependent on the number of
contributors (nOSD ). In other words, the larger the number of developers who
contribute to the code, the more functionalities will be added and the higher
will be the utility of the open source software for all users (i.e., developers and
nDOS
end-users). We specify this second externality by ¶2 (n
D
OS) = α2 (——) d + α2m
nDOS              n
D
OS(1 – ——) (0) = α2 (——) d. Once again, users gain a benefit d from specificm m 
functionalities only if these functionalities fulfil an expressed need. For risk-
nDOS
neutral users, this occurs at a probability of level α2 (——), nDOS Œ [0 ; m]. Thism
FIGURE 1: The utility of proprietary software
(3) We may suppose that these functionalities are ex ante developed by « kernel » developers
and/or by the project manager so that open source software exists once all these functio-
nalities are fully available (e.g., « 1.0 » software version release).
uP = ¶1 (nP) + dq – cL
uP = ¶1 (nP) – cL
Ex post utilities :
q specialized
functionalities developed
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probability is similar to the index of quality for proprietary software. However,
the number of functionalities depends here on the number of developers within
the open source community contribute to the code. The number of developers
is set to be, at most, equal to m, leading to a relative share of – active – deve-
lopers equal to (nOSD /m) = 1. α2 (α2 Œ ]0;1]) is the quality of the managerial
model of the open source community. If α2 = 1 and all the developers act
nDOS
within the community, all the functionalities are developed (i.e., α2 (——) dm
= d). Else (4), α2 < 1 and a smaller share of all the potential functionalities is
eventually developed. It should be noted that m is an exogenous parameter
which depicts the share of developers within the whole community. Hence, the
open source software project cannot rule that share. Moreover, our specifica-
tion of the development externality captures the fact that the share of the func-
tionalities developed depends on the proportion of developers actively invol-
ved in the open source project (i.e., nOS
D /m).
The adoption cost cEUi (0 ≤ c
EU
i ) ≤ c
−EU which is supported by any user i (i Œ
[0,1]), derives from the user’s gross utility. Developers and end-users are clas-
sified according to the level of their adoption costs. Consequently, user i is a
developer and his adoption cost is null when i Œ [0,m]). End-users are ranked
FIGURE 2: Open source software-related adoption costs
(4) E.g., there might be persistence of coordination costs within the community and provision
of a less adequate leadership strategy.
Adoption
cost cEUi    
c−EU
i
cEUi = (——
i – m
1 – m 
) c−EU
Developers End users
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on the segment i Œ [m,1]) according their adoption costs which increase at a
linear rate. By definition, the adoption cost of end-user i is cEUi = ( i–m—1–m)c−EU (cf.
figure 2).
We can express the utility associated with open source adoption by agent i (i
Œ [0,1]) as follows :
nOSD 0   when i Œ [0,m]uOSi = α1n
OS + α2 (——) d – cAi with   cAi = { (3)m cEUi when i Œ [m,1]
III. — THE SEQUENTIAL GAME
The firm knows the different characteristics of the potential users (m, α1,
α2,…) of the proprietary software. It sets out its strategy and users react to this
strategy by formulating their adoption choices. The firm must anticipate the
responses of developers and end-users to its price and quality decisions. It has
complete, but imperfect information about the possible strategies of potential
adopters of its proprietary software. Put differently, the firm knows the diffe-
rent characteristics of the potential users (m, α1, α2,…) of the software solu-
tion, but it can only imperfectly anticipate their choices when there are many
possible equivalent choices. Since we may suppose that the price and the qua-
lity of software cannot be altered at will, we assume that the firm’s and the
users’ choices are sequential. The structure of the sequential game is depicted
in figure 3.
FIGURE 3: Structure of the sequential game
(OS = Open Source Software adoption ; 
P = Proprietary Software adoption ; ∅ = No adoption)
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At the first step of the game, the firm chooses the extent of functionalities q*
and the level of its licence fee cL
* which maximize its expected profit. At the
second step of the game, taking these levels into account, each user i compares
its respective utilities as a proprietary software user (i.e., « P » strategy), an
open source software adopter (i.e., « OS » strategy) or a non adopter (i.e.,
« ∅ » strategy). The individual utilities of users depend on each user’s expec-
ted level of adoption of each software proprietary or OS software. As a sim-
plifying assumption, we suppose that these expectations – whether right or
wrong – are the same for all users. An eductive process generates convergen-
ce of wrong expectations towards the locally stable equilibrium in the area of
stability to which they belong. The game is solved by backward induction.
3.1. Second step of the game
Let us thus consider couple (q, cL). Once we note the expectations 
~nP, ~nOS, 
~nOSD relative to the respective sizes of the population of proprietary software
customers, the population of open source software adopters and the population
of developers who contribute code within open source projects, the choice of
any user i (i Œ [0,1]) is as follows :
n˜OSD     
• choosing P if α1n˜
P + dq – cL ≥ sup { 0, α1n˜OS + α2 (——) d – cAi }m
n˜OSD     
• choosing OS if α1n˜
OS + α2 (——) d – cAi ≥ sup { 0, α1n˜P + dq – cL }m
n˜OSD     
• choosing ∅ if 0 ≥ sup { α1n˜P + dq – cL, α1n˜OS + α2 (——) d – cAi }m
Each agent associates its own optimal choices to each expected level of n˜P,
n˜OS and n˜OSD  . Let us assume conventionally that, if agents expect the level n˜
OS,
they will consistently suppose that this population only includes developers if
n˜OS ≤ m. If n˜OS > m, this population also integrates the end-users whose adop-
tion costs are the lowest (5). Aggregation of these optimal decisions allows us
to deduce the effective proportions of proprietary software users, as well as
both the developers and end-users of open source software (i.e., nP, nOS and  nOSD
respectively), by the expected levels of each populations (see Appendix 1).
Hence, for each pair (q, cL), the condition (n
P, nOS, nOSD  ) = (n˜
P, n˜OS, n˜OSD  ) defines
the Nash equilibrium of the subgame corresponding to the second step of the
game.
(5) This kind of assumption is frequently used in adoption models (see e.g., Crémer, 2000).
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Proposition 1.Whatever the pair (q, cL) that is selected by the firm at the first
step of the game, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium associated with the
second-step sub-game.
Proof of Proposition 1. See Appendix 1.
Without any specific restriction on the values of the parameters, the compe-
tition between open source and proprietary software could provide some tau-
tological and irrelevant outcomes. Since we are first interested in competitive
issues, let us consider the following non restrictive assumption.
Assumption 1. The activity of the proprietary software firm is profitable when
the open source development activity is not introduced.
Assumption 1 only states that in the absence of an open source competitor,
the commercial player can always get a positive market share and earn some
positive profit. Put differently, Assumption 1 states that there is an economi-
cally viable pair (q+, cL
+), i.e., a quality/price combination for the proprietary
software firm, so that i) there is an expected size level n˜P+ of proprietary soft-
ware users which is high enough to provide positive incentives for users to
adopt proprietary software when there is no alternative, and ii) for this pair (q+,
cL
+), the profit of the firm π = cL
+ – β (q+)2 is non-negative. Proposition 2
derives from Assumption 1.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the distribution of users {nP* = 1, nOSD
* = 0,
nOS* = 0} which corresponds to the full adoption of proprietary software is
always a Nash equilibrium of the second-step subgame.
Proof of Proposition 2. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 establishes that the viability of proprietary software alone is a
sufficient condition to generate a Nash equilibrium in which open source soft-
ware is always crowded out. In that case, users do not adopt the open source
software.
With Assumption 1, the second-step subgame has at least one equilibrium.
At this equilibrium, the open source development activity is crowded out and
all the users adopt proprietary software. But there may be other equilibria.
Consider for instance the extreme case in which adoption cost cAi vanishes
whatever i is. With a sufficiently low value of q and a sufficiently high value
of cL, inequality ¶1 (0) + dq – cL ≤ 0 ≤ ¶1 (1) + dq – cL may hold. Since ¶1 (1)
+ ¶2 (m) – c
A
i is non-negative in this case whatever i, condition sup {0, ¶1 (0) +
dq – cL} ≤ ¶1 (1) + ¶2 (m) – c
A
i also applies to all the users. Outcome {n
P** = 0,
nOSD
** = m, nOS** = 1} is thus a second equilibrium in the second-step subgame.
By continuity, the same result is maintained when cAi = ei ("i) with ei close to
0. Hence, {nP** = 0, nOSD
** = m, nOS** = 1} exists for a non-empty range of varia-
tion of cAi ,  i. However, as c
A
i is far from being null for a part of the popula-
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tion of end-users, this « Winner-Takes-All » (now, WTA) – open source – equi-
librium does not exist for all possible values of c−EU. Last, for some values of
c−EU, other equilibria may exist. As opposed to WTA equilibria {nP* = 1, nOSD
* = 0,
nOS* = 0} and {nP** = 0, nOSD
** = m, nOS** = 1}, these equilibria are « mixed »,
that is to say, they split users into two sub-populations, namely users of pro-
prietary software and users of open source software (6).
We then introduce a second reasonable assumption parallel to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2. The higher level of adoption costs that users may face is upper
bounded so that c−EU ≤ (α1 + dα2).
This assumption supposes that the end-user who exhibits the largest adop-
tion cost c−EU always gets a non-negative utility from adopting open source
software. This assumption is similar to the conditions that a proprietary soft-
ware firm faces for its activity to remain profitable.
We add a third assumption for the expectations of the agents.
Assumption 3. Agent i cannot simultaneously adopt open source software and
expect that a share of agents less than i adopt it.
Assumption 3 excludes some cases in which expectations and choices will
not be consistent. This leads us to suppose that agents are aware of their ran-
king among other users and are likely to integrate this information in their
adoption decisions by excluding expectations that are inconsistent with their
rankings.
Under these three assumptions, we can analyse in depth both the nature and
the stability of the second-step subgame equilibria (see Appendix 1). At this
stage, the firm has already set cL and q. The remaining variables which have to
be determined by the users are nP* (i.e., the Nash equilibrium proportion of
agents adopting proprietary software), nOS* (i.e., the Nash equilibrium propor-
tion of agents adopting open source software) and nOS*D (i.e., the Nash equili-
brium proportion of developers among agents adopting open source software).
According to our specifications of ¶1 (.), ¶2 (.) and g (.), and given Assumptions
1, 2 and 3, the typology of the Nash equilibrium in this second-step subgame
can be analysed by considering all the possible values of parameters α1, α2, 
c−EU, m and d, as well as the first-step control variables (i.e., q and cL). Table 1
summarizes the three main cases we identify. Appendix 1 presents the seven
subcases we obtain from our analysis and their graphical representations.
(6) Note that there may be many separating equilibria in a more general case when functions
¶1 (.) and ¶2 (.) are not linear and function g (.) is not quadratic. Although our linear-qua-
dratic specification limits the range of possibilities, the multiplicity of Nash separating
equilibria is a possible outcome in the second-step subgame.
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In case A, there are three Nash equilibria, only two of which are stable. In
this case, either proprietary software or open source software is adopted at the
equilibrium, but both types of software never simultaneously co-exist at the
end of eductive process. These cases exhibit a WTA situation. The area of
attraction of this type of equilibrium is defined by the location of the unstable
« mixed » equilibrium (E3, see Appendix 1). When the initial users’ expecta-
tions about the adoption of open source software are below a critical level, pro-
prietary software is eventually adopted by all the users at the end of the educ-
tive process. In contrast, open source software will be adopted if expectations
are beyond this critical level.
Case B corresponds to a situation in which there is a single stable WTA
equilibrium situation in which either proprietary software or open source soft-
TABLE 1: Nash equilibria of the second step of the game
The index of each subcase refers to Appendix 1
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ware is adopted. Finally, Case C corresponds to a situation in which there are
two stable equilibria. As already emphasized, the first equilibrium is still a
WTA equilibrium according to which all users adopt proprietary software.
However, the second equilibrium depicts patterns of mixed adoption because
some users adopt open source software and others adopt proprietary softwa-
re. All things being equal, case C occurs for low levels of adoption costs and
high levels of quality related to the managerial model of the open source com-
munity (i.e., α2).
These results stand for one given (q, cL) strategy of the firm. Solving back-
ward, we define the equilibrium in the first-step subgame that maximizes the
profit of the proprietary software firm.
3.2. First step of the game
The first step of the game corresponds to the choice of the pair (q, cL) which
maximizes the expected profit of the firm, given the ex post adoption scenarios
that are most likely to apply.
At this stage, the firm has to choose the pair (q, cL) which maximizes its pro-
fit function. As the second-step subgame equilibrium is generally not unique, the
firm has to integrate each possible stable outcome which is associated with the
second step of the game that results from pair (q, cL). The occurrence of these
stable equilibria and their related payoffs also have to be considered. The beha-
viour of the firm towards risk may influence the shape of its objective function.
For simplicity, we suppose that the firm is risk-neutral and only considers the
expected profit that is generated by the different outcomes of the second-step
subgame as answers to its choices at the first step of the game (7). The expected
profit of the firm associated with a given pair (q, cL) uses an objective or sub-
jective distribution of probability on the occurrence of the stable equilibria of the
second-step subgame. The form of this distribution obviously influences the
firm’s decision. As the firm’s information is imperfect, it reasonably anticipates
a uniform distribution [0,1] of the level of open source software adoption n˜OS.
We label {nP†, nOS†D   , n
OS†} (resp. {nP††, nOS††D , n
OS††}) the population that corres-
ponds to an unstable (resp. stable) second-step Nash equilibrium. From
Assumption 3, the size of the respective areas of stability of the second-step sub-
game equilibria provides the required distribution of probability which gene-
rates the expected profit of the firm, which is expressed by (4) : 
π =     max     [0, (p* + p†† nP†† (cL, q)) cL – βq2] (4)
c
L
≥ 0, q Œ [0,1]
(7) We make this assumption because the probability of an unstable equilibrium occurring is
zero in this context.
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Where :
• p* = 1 and p†† = 0 when (q, cL) and (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU) correspond to sub-
cases (3) and (6) (see Appendix 1),
• p*= nP† and p†† = (1 – nP†) when (q, cL) and (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU) correspond
to subcases (1), (2), (4) and (5) (i.e., nP†† (cL, q) = 0, see Appendix 1),
• p* = nP† and p†† = (1 – nP†) when (q, cL) and (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU) correspond
to subcase (7) (i.e., 0 < nP†† (cL, q) < 1, see Appendix 1).
We can deduce the existence of an optimal outcome for the firm at the first
step of the game and that of an equilibrium in the two-step game.
Proposition 3. An optimal outcome always exists for the firm at the first step
of the game.
Proof of Proposition 3. See Appendix 2.
Corollary. An equilibrium of the two-step game always exists. When this
equilibrium is not unique, equilibria correspond – except for cases of vani-
shing measure – to a single level of both functionalities and licence cost of pro-
prietary software, but leads to different levels of adoption of proprietary soft-
ware and open source software.
Comparison among subcases 1, 2 and 3 illustrates the nature of the choice
made by the firm at the first step of the game. In these three cases, the same
condition α1 (1 – m) > c
−EU is met on three out of five parameters. According to
the last two, d and α2, which characterize the efficiency of the effort of the firm
and that of adoption externalities, the firm decides to choose a rather low level
of quality and a high level of price with a probability of success that is less than
1 in subcases 1 and 2 or a rather high level of quality and low level of price
with a probability of success that is equal to 1 in subcase 3.
In subcases 1 and 2, the level of profit of the firm may be large if success
eventually applies, but this success may not occur. In subcase 3, profit is lower,
but the firm can always increase this level.
We next present three numerical examples to analyse possible competition
outcomes.
3.3. Some illustrative examples
The first example considers values of parameters corresponding to case A
(α1 = 1, d = 1, α2 = 1, β = 0.2, m = 0.2, c
−EU = 0.1). In this case, direct exter-
nality ¶1 (.) outweighs the adoption cost incurred by the marginal user.
Remember, that the final outcome is always a winner-takes-all (WTA) situa-
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tion, which leads to the crowding out of one of the two software producers. We
plot the firm’s expected profit for different (q, cL) strategies ; figure 5 presents
the results (8).
The maximum expected profit (denoted π max) here is strictly positive and
reaches an interior value of the strategy set (cL
* = 0.6 and q* = 0.2). The right
hand side figure depicts the expected diffusion of open source software, i.e.,
the probability that open source software is diffused to the whole population.
It shows how the proprietary firm can indirectly – and partially – control the
FIGURE 5: Expected profit of the firm (left) and expected diffusion
of open source software (right) as a function
of the quality and the license cost charged by the firm
(α1 = 1, d = 1, α2 = 1, β = 0.2, m = 0.2, c
−EU = 0.1) ;
π max = 0.043 > 0 reached for (cL
* = 0.6 and q* = 0.2)
(8) For each strategy, we consider the relative positions of the UP and UOS curves. From this
comparison, we deduce the most suitable subcase (i.e., subcase 1, 2 or 3) and we can com-
pute the expected profit and the expected diffusion of the open source project. If UP < 0
(" i Œ [0,1]), no user adopts proprietary software. Therefore, the firm does not make any
investment on quality-based features and the profit of the firm is null.
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°136, 4ème trimestre 2011 125
diffusion of open source software by setting different price and quality strate-
gies. When the firm chooses a « low price-high quality » strategy, it can crowd
the open source community out of the market (i.e., the expected diffusion of
open source software is close to 0). However, this example illustrates that the
firm has no incentive to do this due to the development costs. Instead, the
expected diffusion of open source software which corresponds to the optimal
strategy of the firm is found to be equal to 0.91. Here, the firm develops only
20 % of the full set of functionalities it could develop.
Thus, the firm faces a trade-off inasmuch as it may select a strategy that
crowds out the open source project by setting a high quality and/or low license
cost, or it may apply a « low quality and/or high price » strategy. In the latter
case, the firm gets a maximal profit when the WTA – proprietary – equilibrium
is reached, but it risks being crowded out (i.e., open source software is massi-
vely adopted). The optimal behaviour of the firm has to be understood as a
balance between these two strategies. We could mitigate this result by taking
account of the firm’s risk aversion. However, we suggest that this change would
not change our results qualitatively. Indeed, a more risk-averse firm would be
likely to minimize the risk of being crowded by applying an optimal « conser-
vative » strategy (i.e., a quality increase and/or price decrease strategy).
The second example depicts a situation in which the presence of specialized
functionalities is very important for shaping adoption patterns (see figure 6).
In this example, we set d = 5 instead of d = 1.
The profit-maximizing strategy here aims at developing a proprietary soft-
ware solution which provides the largest range of specialized functionalities
(q* = 1). Hence, the firm has an incentive to invest in quality in order to diffe-
FIGURE 6 : Expected profit of the firm (left) and expected diffusion of open
source software (right) as a function
of the quality and the license cost charged by the firm
(α1 = 1, d = 5, α2 = 1, β = 0.2, m = 0.2, c
−EU = 0.1) ;
π max = 0.08 > 0 reached for (cL
* = 2.5 and q* = 1)
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rentiate its software from open source software. We note that the expected dif-
fusion of open source software is equal to 0.88. As such, the optimal strategy
of the firm is not to crowd the open source community out of the market.
The third example presents a situation in which users’ needs are rather gene-
ric (see figure 7). Here, the presence of general functionalities shapes adoption
outcomes. Preferences for specific needs are lower-level so that we set d = 0.1.
Our results show that the firm does not develop any specific functionality
(q = 0). Since users assign little importance to specific functionalities, the
firm’s optimal strategy is to focus on generic functionalities and not to invest
in specialized ones. As the first two examples showed, we find that the firm has
no interest in crowding out the open source activity.
IV. — MARKET FAILURE AND THE WELFARE PROPERTIES
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF OSS
The findings from the previous analysis show situations in which multiple
equilibria are likely to prevail as a result of both network and compatibility
externalities. The nature of the equilibrium that emerges, therefore, is related
to the shape of users’ expectations.
On the basis of the previous results, we perform two types of welfare analy-
sis. We need first to deal with the multiplicity of equilibria identified. We have
shown that a single firm strategy is likely to lead to the appearance of multiple
equilibria. So is it possible to rank potential outcomes? Second, we can track
the aims of these outcomes to those likely if the firm acts as a monopolist, that
FIGURE 7: Expected profit of the firm (left) and expected diffusion of open
source software (right)
as a function of the quality and the license cost charged by the firm
(α1 = 1, d = 0.1, α2 = 1, β = 0.2, m = 0.2, c
−EU = 0.1) ;
π max = 0.124 > 0 reached for (cL
* = 0.4 and q* = 1)
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is to say, if there are no open source communities. We conduct these welfare
analyses on our linear-quadratic specification.
When the optimal pair (q*, cL
*) leads to the occurrence of multiple equilibria,
market failure may emerge. For instance, in the linear-quadratic specification,
consider the case where (q*, cL
*) generates two stable WTA – proprietary soft-
ware and open source software – equilibria, i.e., {nP* = 1, nOS*D = 0, n
OS* = 0}
and {nP** = 0, nOS**D = m, n
OS** = 1}. Comparison of these WTA equilibria pro-
vides the following result in the linear-quadratic case.
Proposition 4. When the optimal price/quality pair (q*, cL
* ) is associated with
two stable WTA equilibria at the second-step subgame,
i) if a coordination failure occurs, the higher-level equilibrium is always the
WTA – proprietary – one. All things being equal, this case prevails when deve-
lopment externalities are low-level ;
ii) if a conflict of interest occurs, this conflict rises between developers and
part of or all the end-users on one hand and the firm with – or without – some
other end-users on the other hand. All things being equal, this case prevails
when development externalities are high-level.
Proof of Proposition 4. See Appendix 3.
The first part of Proposition 4 indicates that there are cases where a low level
of expectations related to the adoption of proprietary software may eventually
generate a WTA – open source – solution that is not beneficial even to develo-
pers. In these cases, all users join the open source community due to the sha-
ping of users’ expectations. However, as the quality of the managerial model
of the project (i.e., α2) is low, a low share of functionalities is developed. The
second part of Proposition 4 establishes that the WTA – open source – solution
(resp. WTA – proprietary – solution) delivers the better outcome for both deve-
lopers and some end-users (resp. the firm and the other end-users).
These results may be extended by a complementary proposition where one
of the stable solutions is a mixed equilibrium.
Proposition 5. When the optimal price/quality pair (q*, cL
*) is associated with
one WTA – proprietary – solution and one mixed equilibrium at the second-
step sub-game,
i) if a coordination failure occurs, the higher-level equilibrium is always the
WTA – proprietary – one. All things being equal, this case prevails when deve-
lopment externalities are low-level ;
ii) if a conflict of interest occurs, this conflict rises between developers and a
part of all the end-users on the one hand, and the firm and the other end-users
on the other hand. All things being equal, this case prevails when development
externalities are high-level.
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Proof of Proposition 5. See Appendix 3.
Proposition 5 confirms Proposition 4. Due to the existence of the externali-
ties generated by each type of software, when the equilibria can be ranked
according to welfare, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient even if the firm is
not considered in the welfare analysis. Propositions 4 and 5 show that an even
larger diffusion of open source software may not be beneficial to users.
However, these two propositions enable us to identify some cases in which this
diffusion may be detrimental to the users’ surpluses. Furthermore, Proposition
5 stresses that the incentives of some users and the firm may be aligned in
some situations. Propositions 4 and 5 are in contrast to the following.
Proposition 6. Suppose that a (unique or not) WTA – proprietary – equili-
brium is associated with the optimal price/quality pair (q*, cL
*) in a framework
in which adopters are able to choose between proprietary and open source
software. All users prefer this equilibrium to the WTA – proprietary – one that
emerges in a framework in which they cannot choose open source software.
Proof of Proposition 6. See Appendix 3.
Proposition 6 counterbalances Propositions 4 and 5. Even if open source
software is not eventually selected or adopted, the existence of a « potential
competitor » for proprietary software provides strong incentives for the pro-
ducer to lower the price or to improve the quality of its product. The ensuing
outcome is always found to be beneficial to all the users. Propositions 4 and 5
compare the properties of the two possible equilibria when the open source
community already acts in the software market. They show that the magnitu-
de of the development externality is critical to identify the agents that benefit
from the equilibrium eventually selected. Moreover, when there is a conflict of
interest, we show that it does not affect the firm and all users, but rather that
the interests of some users are aligned to those of the firm. In particular, we
find that users whose adoption costs are high have the same interest than the
editor, whereas the users whose adoption are low are aligned to the interests of
the open source community.
V. —  DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper analysed the competition dynamics and coordination issues like-
ly to arise from the introduction of open source solutions in the software mar-
ket. We aimed to identify how a proprietary software firm defines its price/qua-
lity strategy by taking account of lock-in effects and users’ expectations as
well as the varying abilities of adopters to contribute or not to code in open
source projects. Our results show that multiple – winner-takes-all and mixed –
equilibria may emerge from the competition game between firms and the open
source community. Moreover, depending on the users requirements for soft-
ware functionalities, we show there are cases where i) the firm has no interest
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in investing in quality or ii) has incentives to develop all the functionalities to
maximize its profit.
A striking result is that the firm may have a rational (i.e., market-based)
interest in not trying to crowd the open source community out of the market
(accommodating strategy), inasmuch as it is limited in its abilities to fully
select the equilibrium which allows it to reach out the highest-level outcomes.
Also, the welfare analysis shows that the open source « threat » is likely to
increase levels of social surplus because it provides strong incentives for the
firm to lower its price or to improve the quality of its product. As a conse-
quence, the software market may be seen as an hybrid « system » in which tra-
ditional commercial firms have to adapt to the development of atypical pro-
duction activities. Whatever the final outcome, be it market-shared or not, our
findings suggest how commercial players need to revise their strategies for
their presence to be sustainable in the long run. Such results relates to previous
results obtained in the literature on competition between open source and pro-
prietary software and also focuses on new insights (entry threat and welfare
analysis) less analyzed in previous papers.
These findings indicate first that we need further numerical exploration of
different scenarios. One direction is related to how the efficiency of the orga-
nization of open source projects – captured by α2 in our model – impacts on
their potential diffusion. Within our framework, this impact could be analysed
by studying the reaction of the firm to alternative degrees of efficiency.
Second, we could extend the analysis by considering an additional step in
which the firm revises its price-quality strategy. This could be done as a repea-
ted game. However, this would raise additional problems since many choices
are not easily reversible (e.g., adoption of users and quality of the firm).
Our focus in this paper was clearly on competitive linkages between open
source and proprietary software. However, we might also consider alternative
strategies related to the commercial firm’s quality policy. For example, Lerner
and Tirole (2001), Dahlander (2007) and Rolandsson et al. (2011) argue that
firms can understand competition better by allowing their own developers to
be involved in open source projects, by innovating as well as by using the open
source ideology to improve their production levels and to detect skilled deve-
lopers. Dahlander and Magnusson (2005 ; 2008) and Stam (2009) stress that
firms may benefit directly from open source communities by managing their
activities because the knowledge required to develop software will then be
controlled by both the firm and the surrounding communities. As the addition
of a specific functionality may be too costly, Krishnamurthy (2003),
Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) and Dahlander and Wallin (2006) point out that firms
should be encouraged to support open source projects to lower their produc-
tion costs. In our framework, the open source « threat » may also provide the
proprietary firm with assets (e.g., source code, developers, toolkits) allowing it
to improve the quality of its product at lower cost. Proprietary firms may then
be able to benefit from the increasing popularity of some open source projects
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and to develop new approaches to generate value from atypical organizations
by switching to a « hybrid business model ». Departing from a pure competi-
tion viewpoint, such arguments leave room for further analysis of new forms
of cooperation between open source communities and commercial players.
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APPENDIX 1
NASH EQUILIBRIA OF THE SECOND-STEP SUBGAME
Proof of Proposition 1 : Given that n˜OSD = inf [n˜
OS, m], let us consider the choi-
ce which is made by agent i when he observes pair (q, cL) at the second step
of the game :
n˜OSD     
• Choosing P if α1n˜
P + dq – cL ≥ sup { 0, α1n˜OS + α2 (——) d – cAi }m
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n˜OSD     • Choosing OS if α1n˜
OS + α2 (——) d – cAi ≥ sup { 0, α1n˜P + dq – cL }m
n˜OSD     • Choosing ∅ if 0 ≥ sup { α1n˜P + dq – cL, α1n˜OS + α2 (——) d – cAi }m
The analysis of the second-step subgame consists of proving the existence of
fixed points to correspondence  = {tP, tOS, t∅} from {[0,1], [0,1], [0,1]} to
itself, where  associates – for all the values of parameters (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU)
and variables (q, cL) – the actual population (n
P, nOS, n∅) of adopters with the
set (n˜P, n˜OS, n˜∅) which corresponds to the same expected populations. Since n˜∅
and n∅ are defined so that n˜∅ = 1 – n˜P – n˜OS and n∅ = 1 – nP – nOS, correspon-
dence  has the same properties as correspondence ′ = {tP, tOS} from {[0,1],
[0,1]} to itself which associates the pair of effective populations (nP, nOS) to the
pair of expected populations (n˜P, n˜OS).
As ′ is defined from a compact set to itself, the continuity of tP and tOS is a
sufficient condition to prove the existence of at least one fixed point of ′ from
which we can then deduce the existence of a fixed point of . Whatever (α1,
α2, d, m, c
−EU), (q, cL) and (n˜
P, n˜OS) are, nP corresponds to the subset of i Œ [0,1]
which is defined so that α1n˜
P + dq – cL ≥ sup {0, α1n˜OS + (α2d—m  ) n˜OSD – cAi } and nOS
corresponds to the subset of i Œ [0,1] which is defined so that α1n˜
OS + (α2d—m ) n˜OSD
– cAi ≥ sup {0, α1n˜
P + dq – cL}. These subsets are closed ones in [0,1] as well
as their complementary n∅. Each term that defines nP and nOS is continuous on
n˜P and n˜OS, and nP and nOS are therefore continuous on n˜P and n˜OS. Thus, n∅ is
also continuous on n˜P and n˜OS, and correspondences  and ′ are shown to be
continuous on n˜P and n˜OS. Since these transformations are defined from a com-
pact set to itself, they admit at least one fixed point. This (these) fixed point(s)
is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) of the second-step subgame. Let us
now suppose that {nP*, nOS*, n∅*} is (one of) the fixed point(s) of this transfor-
mation. The size of population nOS*D can be then elementarily deduced from n
OS*
D
= inf [nOS*, m].
Proof of Proposition 2 : Let us introduce (q+, cL
+) as an economically viable
pair of quality and licence cost of proprietary software. When open source
software is not available in the software market, since agents are not ex ante
differentiated in their abilities to access to proprietary software, users (1 – n˜P+)
eventually adopt proprietary software if users n˜P+ (n˜P+ be a given value) find
they would benefit from adopting proprietary software. Hence, if nP+ is a Nash
equilibrium of the second-step subgame, nP+ = 1. Let us now consider that
open source software applies in the software market for same pair (q+, cL
+) and
let us suppose that the expected distribution of agents is given by {n˜P, n˜OSD , n˜
OS}
= {1, 0, 0}. The individual utilities which are generated by this distribution are
uP = α1 + dq
+ – cL
+ ≥ α1n
P+ + dq+ – cL
+ ≥ 0 when user i adopts proprietary soft-
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ware and uOSi = – c
A
i ≤ 0, "i, when user i adopts open source software. For any
user i, inequality α1n˜
P + dq – cL ≥ sup {0, α1n˜OS + α2 (n˜
OS
D —m  ) d – cAi } holds and
{nP, nOSD , n
OS} = {1,0,0}. This proves that {nP*, nOS*D , n
OS*} = {1,0,0} is a Nash
equilibrium for pair (q+, cL
+) in a context in which users can adopt open sour-
ce software, which demonstrates Proposition 2.
Derivation of the Nash equilibria of the second-step game: The possible
outcomes of the second-step subgame can be described according to the values
of both parameters, α1, α2, c
−EU, m and d, and variables q and cL. For each set
of values of these parameters and variables, we simultaneously use two related
figures both of which capture the role of expectations on the individual utili-
ties associated with the three adoption strategies (i.e., proprietary software
adoption, open source software adoption, and no-adoption). In the upper chart,
we display the utility of the ith agent respectively as a user of proprietary soft-
ware and a user of open source software. Agents j (j Œ [0, i]) adopt open sour-
ce software and agents k (k Œ [i,1]) adopt proprietary software. As such, we
designate agent i as « marginal » agent. Intersections here define interior solu-
tions, that is to say, the equilibria that are defined so that one part of the agents
adopts open source software whereas the other part of the agents adopts pro-
prietary software. The situation according to which all the agents adopt pro-
prietary software is always shown to be a solution when uPi – that is to say the
utility of marginal agent i when he adopts proprietary software – is positive or
null when i = 0. In a similar way, the situation according to which all the agents
adopt open source software is always shown to be a solution when uOSi – that is
to say, the utility of marginal agent i when he adopts open source software – is
so that uOSi ≥ [u
P
i  , 0] when i = 1.
Let us first consider case 1 which is defined by conditions α1 (1 – m) > c
−EU,
dq – cL > – α1 and dq – cL < α1 (2m – 1) + dα2. The equation of the curve which
provides the utility of marginal agent i when he adopts proprietary software is
α1 (1 – i) + dq – cL. From figure 1a, one can see that the slope of the u
P
i -curve
for marginal agent i does not depend on its type (i.e., developer or end-user).
Indeed, such a slope only depends on the level of externality which is genera-
ted by proprietary software, that is to say the rank of marginal agent i. This
property explains why the shape of uPi is linear. The equation which corres-
ponds to the level of utility which is reached out by marginal agent i when he
adopts open source software is α1i + α2
i–m d if i Œ [0, m] and α1i + α2d – 
—i–m1–m c
−EU if i Œ [m,1]. As a consequence, the slope of uOSi depends on the rank of
marginal agent i. Indeed, this slope is α1+α2 
1–m d if iŒ [0, m] and α1 – 
1––1–m c
−EU
if i Œ [m,1]. According to the sign of this last term, we can distinguish two
types of cases, namely i) cases in which adoption costs only dampen the effect
of adoption externalities and ii) cases in which adoption costs are higher-level
than the adoption externalities that are supported by end-users. Curves uPi and
uOSi may exhibit no, one or two intersection(s) within the interval [0,1]. Let us
first consider the case in which one intersection occurs. In this case, this single
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intersection between curves uPi and u
OS
i corresponds to the critical level of adop-
tion of open source software which is sufficient eventually to lead to the adop-
tion of open source software. By supposing that all the agents j (j Œ [0, i]) do
adopt open source software, this single intersection defines the ith agent who
indifferently adopts open source software or open source software. Subsequent
agents then prefer to adopt proprietary software.
Figure 1b presents the size of the population of users who adopt open sour-
ce software as a function of its expected level. From A2, we have uOSi ≥ u
∅
i = 0,
"i. A2 hence rejects that n˜∅ ≠ 0 for any case. Hereby, n˜P = 1 – n˜OS and trans-
formation nOS = tOS (n˜P, n˜OS) can be expressed as a single-variable function of
n˜OS. Figure 1b thus represents a transformation of nOS = tOS (n˜P, n˜OS). From A3,
agents adopt open source software in such a way that the end-users with the
lowest levels of adoption costs adopt first. The intersections of this function
with the 45°-curve can be seen as the levels which are associated with the size
of the population of users who adopt open source software that are both expec-
ted and realized according to their rational choices. The positions of these
interstections define the Nash equilibria of the second-step subgame.
Figures 1a and 1b can be interpretated as follows. As long as marginal user
i does not intend to adopt open source software whereas agents j (j Œ [0, i]) are
expected to adopt it, the function that associates the level of open source soft-
ware adoption with the expected one remains below the 45°-curve. The 45°-
curve and a vertical axis intersect so that the ensuing intersection between uPi
and uOSi is reached on the increasing part of function u
OS
i for i Œ [0, m[. This
intersection defines a mixed Nash equilibrium, namely E3. Here, the agents
whose adoption costs are lower adopt open source software at E3 whereas the
other agents adopt proprietary software. For values of i defined so that i Œ
[m,1], let us note that the slope of function uOSi remains positive. There conse-
quently exists a second value for i so that all the agents adopt open source soft-
ware when the size of the population of open source users is expected to be at
least equal to level i. In this case, the shape of the curve that connects the level
of adoption of open source software to the expected one is presented in figu-
re 1b. There is a Nash equilibrium, namely E2, which stands at the north-east
corner of the box. When no agent is supposed to adopt open source software,
the Nash equilibrium E1 of Proposition 2 stands at the south-west corner of the
box.
In the case of static expectations, the local stability of the Nash equilibria can
also be analysed by using figure 1b. Let us thus suppose that agents expect the
size of the population of open source users to take a value between  the values
which are associated with equilibrium E1 and equilibrium E3. Here, all the
agents decide to adopt proprietary software. We hence conclude that all the ini-
tial expectations for fairly low levels of open source software adoption rapid-
ly converge to the Nash equilibrium according to which the open source com-
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munity is fully crowded out, namely E1. Let us now suppose that agents expect
the size of the population of open source users to take a value between the
values associated with equilibrium E3 and equilibrium E2. Here, the agents
who declare their intention to adopt open source software are more numerous
than expected. Indeed, some of the agents who were initially likely to adopt
proprietary software change their strategy and switch to open source software.
Successive iterations show that the number of open source software adopters
increases until eventually reaching equilibrium E2.
Nash equilibria of the second step of the game: subcases
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Other cases are shown to apply, depending on the values of both parameters
and variables. They are depicted in figures 2 to 7. Let us note that A1 excludes
any case in which curve uPi has no positive intersection with the ordinate axis,
except – from A2 – the case in which there exists one single equilibrium accor-
ding to which no users adopt software.
Nash equilibria of the second step of the game: subcases 1 to 3
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Nash equilibria of the second step
of the game: subcases 4 to 6
Nash equilibria of the
second step
of the game: subcase 7
.../...
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APPENDIX 2 :
NASH EQUILIBRIA OF THE FIRST-STEP SUBGAME
Proof of Proposition 3 :Whatever (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU, β) is, when cL Æ + ∞,
and since values for quality q cannot exceed value q = 1, demand for proprie-
tary software vanishes and profit is negative. If a maximal solution for expres-
sion (4) exists, this solution is always reached for finite values of (q, cL).
Expression (4) directly depends on (q, cL) from a continuous way. Besides, it
also directly depends on  from nP†† (cL, q), and it indirectly depends on (q, cL)
from p†† = (1 – nP†). The shape of expression (4) suggests that – when the
second-step subgame provides three equilibria – the continuity of the two
terms varying with (q, cL) is a sufficient condition to provide the continuity of
expression (4) on (q, cL).
The equilibria of the second-step subgame are the fixed points which are
related to correspondence . Correspondence  is defined in the proof of
Proposition 1 (see Appendix 1).  is generated by the intersection between
α1n˜
P + dq – cL and α1n˜
OS + α2 ( n˜
OS
d —m ) d – cAi , i Œ [0,1]. Note that only the first
term continuously depends on (q, cL) and that the intersection then conti-
nuously moves on (q, cL). Correspondence  is thus continuous on (q, cL) and
its fixed points are also continuous on (q, cL). We can deduce that expression
(4) is also continuous on (q, cL). Since value 0 is the lower bound for profit, (q,
cL) is defined on a compact and  admits at least one maximum on this com-
pact, which proves Proposition 3.
An illustration of the continuity of nP† (cL, q) and n
P†† (cL, q) is given by
considering the cases analysed at the end of Appendix 1. Consider for instan-
ce the values of (α1, α2, d, m, c
−EU) and (q, cL), which are defined by the condi-
tions of cases 4 and 5. Conditions α1 (1 – m) < c
−EU and dq – cL < α1 + dα2
– c−EU are common conditions for these two cases. The switch from case 4 to
case 5 corresponds to the transition from condition – α1 < dq – cL < α1 (2m
– 1) + dα2 to condition α1 (2m – 1) + dα2 < dq – cL. Note that the transition
case  α1 (2m – 1) + dα2 = dq – cL is not represented. It appears that the corres-
pondence captured by figures 4b and 5b moves continuously by exhibiting a
progressive shift of nP† (cL, q) from the left side to the right side of m. Similar
continous transitions can be analysed, for example, from case 1 to case 2 and
from case 4 to case 7. In the latter situation (switch from cases 4 to 7), one may
observe a continuous shift of nP† (cL, q) and n
P†† (cL, q) with (q, cL).
APPENDIX 3 :
MARKET FAILURES AND WELFARE PROPERTIES
Proof of Proposition 4 : Let us suppose that the optimal quality/price (q*, cL*)
leads to the case in which two stable equilibria occur, namely E1 = {nP* = 1,
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nOSD
* = 0, nOS* = 0} and E2 = {nP** = 0, nOSD
** = m, nOS** = 1}. At equilibrium E1,
individual utility of users is uniform and given by uPi = α1 + dq
* – cL
*. At equi-
librium E2, utility is uOSD = α1 + α2d for developers and u
OS
i = α1 + α2d
– c−EU for the end-users. On the developers’ side, the result of the comparison
between the two equilibria is so such that E1 is preferred or indifferent to E2 when
α2 ≤ q
* – (cL
*/d) and E2 preferred or indiferrent to E1 when α2 ≥ q
*
– (cL
*/d). If (q*, cL
*) is an optimal solution for the firm, the expected profit is posi-
tive or null and uPi = α1 + dq
* – cL
* ≥ 0. On the end-users’ side, the result of the com-
parison between the two equilibria is such that E1 is preferred or indifferent
(cL
* – c−EUi )
to E2 when α2 ≤ q
* – ———— and E2 is prefered or indifferent to E1 when
d
(cL
* – c−EUi )
α2 ≥ q
* – ————. One can conclude that WTA – proprietary – equilibrium E1
d
is preferred by all users and the firm when α2 ≤ q
* – (cL
*/d), and that a conflict
of interest occurs in the other cases.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let us suppose that optimal quality/price (q*, cL
*) leads to
E1 is such that E1 is preferred or indifferent to E3 = {nP** = 0, nOSD  
** = m, nOS** = h},
in a framework in which the linear-quadratic specification is defined so that m < h <1.
At equilibrium E1, individual utility of users is uniform and given by uPi = α1 + dq
* – cL
*.
At equilibrium E3, utility is uOSD = α1h + α2d for developers, u
OS
i = α1h + α2d – ——
(i – m)
(1 – m)
c−EUi (m < i ≤ h) for the first set of end-users, and u
P
i = α1 (1 – h) + dq
* – cL
*
(h ≤ i ≤ 1) for the second set of end-users. On the developers’ side, the comparison bet-
ween the two equilibria is such that E1 is prefered or indiferent to E3 when α2 ≤ q
*
α1 (1 – h) cL
*
+ ———— – —  and E3 preferred or indifferent to E1 for developers when
d d α1 (1 – h) cL
*
α2 ≤ q
* +   ————— – —. For the first set of end-users (i.e.,  
d                d
end-users whose i is defined so that m < i ≤ h), the comparison between the two
α1 (1 – h)
equilibria leads to E1 preferred or indifferent E3 when α2 ≤ q
* + ————
d
[cL* – –––(i – m) c−EUi ] α1 (1 – h) [cL* – –––(i – m) c−EUi ](1 – m)                                                                                                                               (1 – m)
– —————— and E3 preferred or indifferent E1 when α2 ≥ q
* + ——— – ————.
d d d
For the second set of end-users (i.e., end-users whose i is defined so that h ≤ i
≤ 1), the comparison between the two equilibria is always such that E1 is pre-
ferred or indiferrent to E3.
α1 (1 – h) cL
*
To sum up, a coordination failure occurs when α2 ≤ q
* + ———— – —
d  d
inasmuch as developers and some end-users prefer E1 whereas the firm and the
remaining end-users prefer E3.
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Proof of Proposition 6 : Let us consider the pair (−q, c−L) which corresponds
to the optimal quality/price solution when users have no other alternative than
adopting proprietary software or adopting open source software. The solution
is defined so that the firm receives the whole surplus and the utility of users
vanishes, i.e., mPi = α1 + d
−q – c−L = 0, "i. Profit is then π = c
−
L – βq
−2. Let us
introduce (q*, cL
*) which represents the optimal quality/price solution accor-
ding to which users can choose between proprietary and open source softwa-
re, as well as π (E1) = cL
* – βq*2which is the profit of the firm in the case where
E1 is the second-step Nash equilibrium.
Let us suppose that π (E1) = cL
* – βq*2 = π = c−L
* – βq−2. Hence, cL
* = c−L
*,
q* = q− and uPi (E1) = α1 + dq
* – cL
* = α1 + dq
− – c−L = 0, "i. Let us consider the
agent whose i is defined so that i = 0 (i.e., the first developer). At equilibrium
E1, the utility of this agent is uOSi (E1) = 0 if she adopts open source software
in such a way that she is indifferent between the two types of software. For
levels of expected amount of n˜OS which are higher than 0, her utility is uOSi=0
= α1n˜
OS + α2 (—n˜
OS,
D
m  ) d > 0, with n˜OSD = inf [n˜OS, m]. One can conclude that the agent
whose i is so that i = 0 eventually adopts open source software rather than pro-
prietary software, except in the case in which n˜OSD = 0. As a consequence,
(−q, c−L) cannot be an equilibrium solution, inasmuch as E1 cannot be a locally
stable equilibrium if (q*, cL
*) = (−q, c−L) and π
e (−q, c−L) = 0. E1 is always defined
so that uPi (E1) = α1 + dq
* – cL
* > α1 + dq
− – c−L = 0 "i, which demonstrates
Proposition 6.
